Web password recovery --- a necessary evil? by Maqbali, Fatma Al & Mitchell, Chris J
Web password recovery — a necessary evil?
Fatma Al Maqbali and Chris J Mitchell
Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London
fatmaa.soh@cas.edu.om, me@chrismitchell.net
January 31, 2018
Abstract
Web password recovery, enabling a user who forgets their password
to re-establish a shared secret with a website, is very widely imple-
mented. However, use of such a fall-back system brings with it ad-
ditional vulnerabilities to user authentication. This paper provides a
framework within which such systems can be analysed systematically,
and uses this to help gain a better understanding of how such systems
are best implemented. To this end, a model for web password recovery
is given, and existing techniques are documented and analysed within
the context of this model. This leads naturally to a set of recommenda-
tions governing how such systems should be implemented to maximise
security. A range of issues for further research are also highlighted.
1 Introduction
Despite their widely-documented limitations, passwords remain very widely
used for user authentication. However, although passwords are meant to be
memorized, humans often forget or mislay them. In some contexts this is
easily managed; for example, in an office environment, a user who forgets
their password for access to a multi-user system can simply see a system
administrator, who authenticates them and issues a new password. However,
for web authentication, the main focus of this paper, it is clearly not so
simple; we refer to the process of re-establishing a password in this case as
web password recovery.
Most websites requiring users to create an account support password re-
covery, enabling legitimate users who forget their password to continue to
use the website. This can be achieved in many ways, including use of a pre-
registered email address or mobile phone number, and/or involving other
pre-set fall-back means of authentication. However, many of these tech-
niques introduce vulnerabilities which may enable an impostor to falsely
change a password, either causing a denial of service or, in the worst case,
enabling the impostor to authenticate as the user. In this paper, we analyze
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these issues by first introducing a general model for password recovery, and
then examining various existing password recovery options within the con-
text of this model. We also use the model to look at ways of improving the
security and/or usability of password recovery.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we
review prior art on password recovery, noting that much of the existing work
on password recovery does not match the scope of this paper. This is followed
in section 3 by a general model for web password recovery, intended to
capture the commonly used approaches. Section 4 then reviews the various
ways in which password recovery is performed in practice, within the context
of the model. This then enables us in section 5 to provide a systematic
assessment of the security strengths and weaknesses of existing approaches,
along with potential usability issues. In section 6 we use the results of this
assessment to provide a series of recommendations on the design of password
recovery systems. Section 7 concludes the paper, including a discussion of
possible directions for further research.
2 Prior Art
Many authors have looked at web password recovery, mostly focussing on
particular classes of recovery system or the shortcomings of widely used
approaches.
• Several authors have looked at ways to securely store backup copies
of passwords on a client device; this is outside the scope of password
recovery as we define it, since the web service itself is not involved.
We briefly mention two papers of this type. Ellison et al. [5] describe
how a locally stored copy of a password can be held in encrypted form,
protected using answers to personal questions; the encryption key is
derived from these questions in such a way that correct answers to k
of n questions enables it to be reconstructed, allowing the user to for-
get some of the answers. Somewhat analogously, Frykholm and Juels
[6] propose a provably secure technique for fault-tolerant password re-
covery; a secret password is stored protected by a collection of low
entropy secrets, such that recovery is possible with only a subset of
these secrets. This again enables the user to maintain secured backup
copies of passwords, and hence, like the Ellison et al. scheme, it is
outside the scope of this paper.
• Chmielewski et al. [4] focus on what they call client-server password
recovery. They propose a series of protocols that allow a user to auto-
matically recover a password from a server using partial knowledge of
the password, and prove their security in a formal model. This can be
2
regarded as a contribution to theoretical cryptography, rather than as
a practical solution to the everyday problem of web password recovery.
• Mannan et al. [15] propose a scheme for password recovery rather
different from many commonly used approaches. They propose that
websites maintain copies of user passwords encrypted under a public
key for which the user holds the private key on a personal mobile device
(PMD). When the user invokes the recovery service, the website sends
the encrypted copy to the user, who uses his/her her PMD to decrypt
it.
• Kharudin et al. [13] describe a graphical user authentication method
and propose its use for password recovery. However, the main focus is
on the authentication technique rather than on the password recovery
process.
All the prior art we have so far described, whilst relating to password
recovery, falls outside our scope here, since the proposals are either indepen-
dent of the web server or require major changes in how clients and servers
interact. However, as we describe next, some authors have addressed the
problem we consider here.
• A recent study by Stavova et al. [19] examines the usability of two
password recovery techniques, namely backup codes (primarily used as
a recovery process for two-factor authentication) and the use of trusted
associates (social authentication). They examined a particular scheme
where the backup code is stored as a QR code, to address the issue of
backup codes being forgotten and/or written in clear text. They also
considered a case where the account holder has to call a client centre
to get the first half of the password and a trusted associate has to call
the client center to get the second half of the password.
• Guri et al. [9] point out how details revealed during password recovery
can be used to learn potentially sensitive personal user information.
• A number of authors have examined the security of challenge questions,
a secondary means of user authentication widely used in real-world
password recovery (see section 4.1). In 2008, Rabkin [17] examined
leaks of answers to these questions via social media. In the following
year, Just et al. [11] performed extensive surveys of user behaviour to
analyse the relative security offered by various questions. In parallel
work, also published in 2009, Schechter et al. [18] looked at the se-
curity properties of security questions as a secondary means of user
authentication in the context of password recovery. In 2015, Bonneau
et al. [2] conducted a study using a real-world data set to examine the
security and memorability of security questions. A yet more recent
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study by Gelernter et al. [7] describes a possible man-in the-middle
(MitM) attack on password recovery by using the registration pro-
cess for a malicious MitM website to gather the information needed
(e.g. answers to personal questions) to conduct recovery for a different
website.
3 A General Model
We now present a general model for a password recovery system. It provides
a framework within which we can examine the security of various options
for the recovery process. As discussed above, password recovery is a pro-
cess which enables users to re-establish a password for a website account.
Sometimes referred to as password reset1, password recovery is typically per-
formed when a user forgets the password for a website. There are a variety
of ways in which password recovery can be performed, some more secure
than others, and the general model is intended to capture all the means of
password recovery in current use.
3.1 Constituent Processes
A password recovery process typically involves three sub-processes, namely:
• registration, in which user-specific information to be used during
password recovery is captured by the website,
• password setup, in which the user chooses and sends the website a
new password for that site, and
• recovery, where the user interacts with the website with the goal of
re-establishing a shared secret password.
Typically, the first of these will be performed just once, the second will be
performed infrequently, and the third will be performed whenever necessary.
These three sub-processes are next examined in greater detail.
3.2 Registration
In establishing an account with the website, a user typically sets up a user
name and password, as well as other information for use in the recovery
process. This information is used to ensure the security of the recovery pro-
cess, i.e. to help prevent an unauthorized party from changing the password
to cause a denial of service, or, even worse, obtaining a valid password for
the account. Existing categories of information of this type are examined in
section 4.1.
1We avoid this terminology since it implies changing the existing password, and not all
password recovery schemes involve such a change.
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3.3 Password Setup
We assume the website uses a password to authenticate the user, and so both
initially (probably as part of registration) and whenever the user wishes
to change it, the user will need to supply the website with a password.
Other information, e.g. a ‘password hint’, may be collected at the same
time. Further examples of information that might be gathered in this stage
are given in section 4.2.
3.4 Recovery
Password recovery is typically invoked by a user when he/she forgets the
password for a website. Such a process typically has three stages, as follows.
1. Recovery request. This involves the user signalling to the website to
request password recovery. The website will typically provide a means
for this to occur, e.g. a special button.
2. Request validation. The website checks that the request is valid. A
website may perform user authentication at this stage, obviously using
a means other than the password, although by no means all websites
do this. The website may also attempt to verify that the request
originates from a human rather than a bot, e.g. using a CAPTCHA
[1].
3. Password re-establishment. At the conclusion of this stage, if suc-
cessful, the user is equipped with a valid password for the website.
There are two main implementation approaches.
• The password recovery system can help the user remember (re-
cover) his/her password; this will typically involve the system
keeping a copy of every user password, and password recovery
will involve reminding the user what it is (typically after he/she
has been authenticated).
• The password recovery system can help the user set up a new
password, often referred to as password reset. This may involve
the system giving the user a temporary password, which the user
must change at first use.
Regardless of the particular implementation approach, the recovery pro-
cess will typically involve using a secure communications channel to the user,
e.g. based on a previously registered email address or phone number. Exam-
ples of how each of these steps might be executed are provided in sections
4.3 and 4.4.
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4 Model Components
We next examine how the model components can be instantiated. The
various options introduced here are critically analyzed later in the paper.
4.1 Registration
Registration for the password recovery is typically implemented as part of
a general registration process, in which the user establishes a new account
(known as registering or signing up). As well as gathering information, it
may also involve security-related steps, e.g. solving a CAPTCHA to prevent
automated user account harvesting. It often involves collecting a wide range
of information, including matters not relevant to password recovery (e.g.
payment information); we focus only on information related to password
recovery. Such information can be divided into two main categories:
• personal information, i.e. information about the individual that may
be used for a range of purposes apart from password recovery;
• recovery information, i.e. information used only for password recovery.
A website will also typically require the user to choose a unique user
name (or give an email address to function as a user name) as well as a
password; these two pieces of information are obviously key to password
recovery, although given their special status we do not include them in this
classification. We next look at examples of widely used information types
of both categories.
4.1.1 Personal information
The following are examples of the types of personal information that may
be gathered during registration and subsequently used for password recov-
ery. In each case, examples of websites are given which use the type of
information specified in a password recovery process.
• name (first name, last name), e.g. as gathered by Instagram2;
• gender, e.g. as collected by Facebook3;
• birth date (day, month, year), e.g. as gathered by Google Mail4;
• street address (street name, city, country), e.g. as used by Microsoft
email5;
2https://goo.gl/sG4wDv, accessed: 14/01/2018
3https://goo.gl/wCsLMk, accessed: 14/01/2018
4https://goo.gl/b67119, accessed:14/01/2018
5https://goo.gl/9hbHNX, accessed: 14/01/2018
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• email address, e.g. as collected by Amazon6;
• phone number (e.g. mobile number), e.g. as gathered by Twitter7.
4.1.2 Recovery information
The types of information established purely for password recovery purposes
vary widely, depending on the detailed operation of the recovery process.
We can identify the following general categories.
• Recovery authentication information, i.e. information that can
be used to authenticate the user. Examples include the following.
– Answers to security questions: the website may give a list
of security questions (also known as personal knowledge or chal-
lenge questions), for a user-selectable subset of which the user
must provide answers. These questions cover topics which the
user can easily remember since they relate to the user’s personal
life, e.g. school name, mother’s maiden name, pet name, mem-
orable street address, birthplace, favorite colour, etc. Examples
of websites that request answers to security questions during reg-
istration include Apple and Google. In addition, some websites,
e.g. Alipay.com, allow users to customize the question, i.e. the
user provides both the question and the answer.
– One-time recovery (backup) codes: a website may set up one
or more one-time backup codes, which the user must securely re-
tain for possible future use for account recovery. These backup
codes are typically not used for password recovery as we define
it here, but for closely related purposes. In particular, Facebook
and Google both support the establishment of such codes to en-
able users to recover account access if a second authentication
factor fails or is unavailable, e.g. if a one-time password sent via
SMS or email cannot be accessed by the user. Of course, such
backup codes could also be used for password recovery but, since
we are not aware of any websites using them in this way, we do
not discuss them further in this paper.
• Recovery contact details, i.e. special contact details, such as an
email address or phone number, that are used for password recovery.
Examples of such details include the following.
– Contact details for trusted associates (trustees): i.e. email
addresses or phone numbers for one or more individuals trusted
6https://goo.gl/yrv1fA, accessed: 14/01/2018
7https://goo.gl/uUYysF, accessed: 14/01/2018
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by the account holder, e.g. as used by Facebook. During password
recovery, a verification code is sent to a trustee, who is trusted
to relay it to the correct user.
– Recovery email address: i.e. one or more email addresses to
which a one-time password or a link to a special recovery page is
sent by the website during the recovery process.
– Recovery phone number: i.e. a phone number used to send a
one-time password for recovery purposes.
• Recovery preferences can be gathered at this stage if a website
offers more than one option for password recovery. The user preference
can be established during registration, or, as is the case for Google, the
user is simply offered various options if the password recovery process
is invoked.
4.2 Password Setup
As part of the process of entering a password, the website may gather and
store the following types of information.
• Password hints: when a password is entered, some websites also
request a hint, intended to help the user remember the password. Al-
ternatively, some websites, e.g. Google (see figure 1), record the time
when the password was last changed, and subsequently use this infor-
mation as a password hint when the user makes a password recovery
request.
• Old passwords: some websites, e.g. Gmail, keep old (superseded)
passwords, to enable their use for authentication during password re-
covery.
8
Figure 1: Google password change hint
4.3 Recovery Request and Validation
We consider the request and validation steps together since, in practice,
these steps are often combined. A website will typically provide a simple
means for a user to invoke the password recovery process, e.g. by providing
a link somewhere close to the password field in the login page. Once invoked
the user will typically be asked to perform one or more of the following steps
in order to prevent the acceptance of fraudulent requests:
• solve a CAPTCHA — some websites, e.g. PayPal, use a CAPTCHA
during password recovery to filter out automated attacks;
• answer one or more of the pre-established security questions, e.g. as
performed by Apple;
• select an option for password recovery (if the user registered multiple
methods), e.g. as is the case for Amazon;
• enter the last password the user can recall, e.g. as requested by Google.
Following initial acceptance of the request, a user may be required to
engage in further interactions to validate the request, e.g. as follows.
• An email is sent to the user’s registered address, and the user is asked
to perform a task using information contained in the email, e.g. clicking
on an embedded link or entering a code value.
• An SMS (text) message containing a secret code is sent to the user’s
registered mobile number, and the user is requested to enter this code;
alternatively the user may receive an automated call to his/her mobile
phone and be asked to engage in a short dialogue.
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4.4 Password Re-establishment
We next review some commonly used methods for re-establishing a pass-
word.
• Email reset involves a website sending a message containing secret
information to the registered email address of the user requesting re-
covery. Subsequent use of this information implicitly authenticates
the user, assuming that only the user can access emails sent to his/her
email address. This approach is very widely used; Bonneau et al. [3]
found that 92% of the 138 websites they tested use email-based pass-
word recovery. Various types of secret information are commonly sent,
e.g. as follows.
– Verification codes/temporary passwords are a temporary
means of accessing the user account, purely for the purposes of
establishing a new password, and are used, for example, by Ama-
zon and Wikipedia — see Figure 2. Note that Wikipedia limits
users to one temporary password per 24-hour period, and its tem-
porary passwords expire after a week.
Figure 2: Wikipedia password recovery using temporary password
– Links (URLs) are embedded in emails sent to a user-registered
address. Clicking on such a link (which typically contains a secret
string) redirects the user browser to a page enabling the user to
set up a new password. Some websites, e.g. Twitter, limit the
validity period of such links.
• SMS reset messages are sent to the user’s registered mobile number,
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and typically contain a secret verification code (analogously to email
reset).
• Use of an old password is permitted by some websites, e.g. Google,
as a means of authenticating a user for password recovery. Typically,
it will form only part of the process of authenticating the user.
• Use of a trustee is supported by some websites (e.g. Facebook),
where the trustee is used as a secure communications channel to the
account holder channel for sending secret recovery information, such
as a temporary (one-time) password.
4.5 After Password Re-establishment
After a user has reset his/her password, some websites immediately log out
the user and require a fresh log-in with the new password; others allow
the user to continue without logging-in again. In parallel with this, some
websites notify the account holder via email that password recovery has
occurred, with the goal of alerting users if the recovery was not authorised
by the account holder.
5 Security and Usability Issues
We now consider the security and usability issues for the recovery validation
and password re-establishment techniques given in sections 4.3 and 4.4.
5.1 Security Questions
As observed in section 4.3, security questions are widely used to help ensure
that a recovery request is valid. As discussed in section 2, apart from the
fact that gathering such personal data potentially endangers user privacy, a
range of serious security and usability issues have been identified. Bonneau
et al. [2] identify the following problems.
• Answers to some questions are more readily guessed than others since
they have a small answer space; such questions offer relatively little
protection.
• Some users may provide false answers with the goals of limiting what
is revealed about them and making it harder for impostors to guess
their responses. However, users may forget their false answers, making
the security questions useless in the recovery process.
• Although the questions are designed to cover topics which users will
always know, some questions may nevertheless require the user to re-
member the answer they gave, e.g. which of many pet names they
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chose, or which colour they said was their favourite. Given such ques-
tions are likely to be used very infrequently, and considerable time may
elapse between setting them up and using them, a user’s recollection
of the ‘correct’ answers is likely to fade.
• Cultural differences can have an impact on the memorability of differ-
ent type of questions, e.g. Bonneau et al. [2] found that, for a typical
set of questions, French users are most likely to recall their first phone
number and are least likely to recall their father’s middle name.
Also, the answers to some questions could be obtained via social me-
dia, as discussed by Rabkin [17]. Even more seriously, the same questions
are used by many sites, making possible the type of MitM attack described
by Gelernter et al. [7] (see section 5.5), where a malicious site persuades a
user to register with answers to security questions which are then used to
impersonate the user to another site. The real issue here is that the au-
thentication information (answers to security questions) is not site-specific;
analogous problems arise when users employ the same password with many
sites — this has caused many well-documented security problems, notably
when passwords for one site are compromised and can then be used to try
to impersonate users to other sites8.
The main lessons from this analysis would appear to be that: (a) security
questions should be carefully chosen to maximise the level of security offered;
(b) security questions only offer a limited level of security and should always
be used in combination with other methods; and (c) ideally authentication
information should somehow be made site-specific.
5.2 Trustee-based Recovery
As discussed by Gong and Wang [8], there are a number of security issues
with relying on trusted ‘friends’ of a user to support password recovery.
• The account holder may forget who they chose as trustees, so that an
individual may remain a nominated trustee even if they are no longer
trusted. That is, the state of trust can change with time and a user
could forget to remove a trustee from list.
• Use of trustees can be prone to ‘forest fire attacks’ [8], where compro-
mise of a trustee account can compromise many other accounts.
8This analysis suggests a very simple attack on passwords, where a malicious entity
sets up a site and persuades users to register and choose an ID and password; the site can
then act on the assumption that some users will employ the same user name/password
combinations elsewhere, and can try them out with other sites to see if they work. Such
an attack could be very effective without even requiring any real-time MitM activity or
compromise of existing password databases.
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• Users are sometimes obliged to nominate several trustees, e.g. Face-
book mandates three. This may force the user to select less trusted
associates.
• A malicious trustee could take over an account by triggering password
recovery and (if necessary) comunicating with other trustees (e.g. using
social engineering) to obtain all the secret information necessary.
5.3 Email Reset
A major vulnerability of this approach is its assumption that emails cannot
be intercepted. There are various ways this assumption could be invalidated.
• If emails are retrieved via an unencrypted link, e.g. if the user ac-
cesses email via a browser and the website does not use https, or if a
mail client employs IMAP over a link not protected using SSL/TLS,
then emails might be intercepted. This threat is particularly signif-
icant when using public access networks; a MitM attacker operating
a ‘fake’ public wireless access network could intercept emails received
via SMTP.
• If the reset email is forwarded to a third party, either accidentally or
deliberately, then the contents could be compromised.
• Malware in the client device could be used to obtain the reset email.
For example, Gelernter et al. [7] describe a malicious android applica-
tion which, if installed, can covertly read received emails.
The use of email for distributing reset information also has other risks.
For example, consider the case where the website for which password recov-
ery is being performed is itself a provider of an email service (e.g. Google).
In this case, sending a password reset message by email will not help, as the
user will not be able to log in to retrieve it. In such a case it is common
practice for the user to be asked to register an alternative email address
to be used to distribute recovery information. During password recovery,
in some cases the user will be shown a partially obfuscated version of this
alternative email address, and the user will be asked to confirm that this is
the correct address for use in password recovery. Figures 3 and 4 show this
process as used by Gmail. This is a clear privacy breach, in that it may
well be possible for a third party to learn the entire alternative address, e.g.
by a web search or by automated harvesting of email addresses [9] (see, for
example, Polakis et al. [16]).
Apart from the risk of spam, restricting access to email addresses is
clearly desirable given that email addresses are often used as user identi-
fiers. A further possible problem arising with the use of email relates to
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Figure 3: Partial leakage of
user contact number
Figure 4: Partial leakage of al-
ternative email address
the non-permanent nature of email addresses. A user may register an email
address which may later become re-assigned to someone else, e.g. because
they change service providers or employers. In such a case, a password reset
message may be received by a third party, who could use it to take control of
the user account. Another issue could arise in a work environment in which
employee emails are temporarily forwarded to another person, e.g. because
the employee is sick or on leave; this could be especially hazardous if the
forwardee is temporary or a contract worker.
5.4 Verification Codes and Reset Links
As discussed in section 4.4, there are two main ways email reset can be used
for password recovery, namely by sending a verification code or a reset link.
As discussed above, both give rise to a risk if the reset email is compromised.
Apart from the direct compromise threat, both have other security and
usability issues.
• The following issues are associated with verification codes.
– Lack of entropy: since verification codes are typically short nu-
meric values, they are potentially vulnerable to brute force search-
ing attacks. That is, if a website does not limit the number of
attempts to enter the code, then a simple brute force attack be-
comes possible, as demonstrated by a successful attack on two
Facebook sites [20].
– As discussed in greater detail in section 5.5 in the context of codes
sent via SMS, a user could be misled into revealing a verification
code to a malicious site in a type of phishing attack.
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• Reset links have a slightly different set of associated issues.
– Some websites do not expire unused reset links, i.e. they remain
valid indefinitely. For example, in an experiment we discovered
that a link for rosegal.com remained valid for at least five months.
Since it is hard to understand why a link needs to be valid for
more than a few hours, this represents an unnecessary risk, since
if such a link is ever disclosed it may enable the associated account
to be hijacked.
– Karlof et al. [12] describe a phishing attack on reset link-based
password recovery. The attacker starts password recovery on a
website for a target user, knowing this will cause the website to
send an email containing a link to the target user. Simultaneously
the attacker emails the user asking them to paste the link in an
email they are about to receive into an attacker-controlled web-
site; a similar attack works against verification codes in emails.
This attack is similar to the Gelernter et al. [7] attack on SMS-
based password recovery (see section 5.5).
5.5 SMS Reset
There are a variety of issues associated with the use of SMS reset messages,
many of which are analogous to issues associated with email reset.
• Since codes sent to mobile phones are typically only six numeric digits9,
i.e. there are only 106 possibilities, this means that it may be possible
to successfully guess a code value. It is therefore imperative that
websites limit the number of entry attempts a user is permitted.
• As noted in section 5.1, Gelernter et al. [7] describe an MitM attack
on password recovery: the registration process for a malicious website
is used to gather the answers to personal security questions in order to
successfully complete request validation for a website with which the
user already has an account. Of course, this MitM step does not com-
plete the attack, as the attacked website will typically, after receiving
the correct answers to security questions, send a verification code (e.g.
via SMS) to the genuine user. To complete the attack, the malicious
website (as part of its registration procedure) tells the user to expect
a message containing a verification code which should be entered into
the registration page. If the user enters the verification code received
from the attacked website, the malicious website will now have what
it needs to complete the process of capturing the user’s account. The
9Google and Dropbox both use 6–digit verification codes
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only defence against this attack is for the message containing the ver-
ification code to make it clear which website it is intended for (i.e. the
attacked website rather than the malicious website).
This attack will work against verification codes sent via email or SMS,
although it is much harder for the sending website to make clear how
the code should be used in a 160-character SMS message than in an
email. Indeed, Gelernter et al. [7] describe the results of a detailed
survey of the use of SMS-based verification codes, with the goal of
understanding both how clear the SMS messages are, and how likely
users are to mistakenly enter a code intended for one website into a
box on a different website. They go on to make a series of recommen-
dations regarding how SMS messages should be designed to minimise
the likelihood that a user can be deceived. They also recommend that
the veriirefication code should have a short validity period.
• In some countries, network coverage in rural areas is often poor or
non-existent, meaning it may not be possible for a user to obtain a
verification code sent via SMS. Similarly, if a user is traveling, he/she
may not be able to receive the SMS. Also, occasionally SMS messages
are delayed, which may cause the user to initiate many requests.
• Just as for email reset, the security of SMS reset relies on the assump-
tion that an SMS message is a secure channel to the user. Again, as
for email reset, this assumption can be invalidated in a range of ways,
e.g. as follows.
– Guri et al. [7] describe an attack based on an apparently harmless
Android app which can monitor and redirect SMS messages to
an attacker server. If such an app was installed, then a password
recovery SMS might be compromised.
– If the phone to which the SMS reset is sent is stolen then the
contents of the SMS reset message could be compromised; even if
the phone is password-locked, the message may still be compro-
mised since many phones display the contents of received SMS
messages without requiring the phone to be unlocked.
– SMS reset messages could be intercepted at the network operator,
e.g. by a malicious employee, or when sent over the air interface
if the air interface link is not encrypted (as is the case in some
countries). The reset message could also be intercepted by an
unauthorised base station (an IMSI catcher or ‘Stingray’) [14] or
by exploiting weaknesses in implementations of the SS7 protocol
used by telecomunication companies to communicate with each
other [21].
16
– If the user changes his/her phone number and forgets to notify
the website, then the SMS reset message will be received by the
new owner of that number.
5.6 Other Issues
We conclude this discussion of existing password recovery techniques by
briefly reviewing certain other issues which have a bearing on the security
and/or usability of the password recovery process.
• Use of an old password as the only means of user authentication for
password recovery is clearly dangerous, since one reason a user might
replace a password is because it has been, or it is suspected of hav-
ing been, compromised. It also seems relatively unlikely that a user
will recollect an old password if they cannot remember their current
password.
• Many web services use an email address as a user ID, e.g. Amazon,
Facebook, Dropbox, Instagram, Twitter and LinkedIn. This has the
major advantage of making it easy for the user to remember their ac-
count identifier, and it is also convenient for web service providers to
deliver account-related functions via email as well as simplifying reg-
istration. However, as discussed by Jin et al. [10], there are significant
risks associated with such an approach, not least that an attacker au-
tomatically knows one of the two parts of a user credential set, thereby
facilitating attacks on the password recovery process.
• Password hints may reveal sensitive information, potentially endanger-
ing user security or privacy. For example, the Google password hint
shown in figure 1 indicates when the user last changed his/her pass-
word – this reveals that Google was being used at that time. Whilst
this may not seem so significant, for some sites this could be far more
revealing.
6 Towards Secure Password Recovery
We next provide recommendations on best practice in implementing a pass-
word recovery system. These recommendations are based on the analysis
given in the previous section. We consider the two most security-significant
steps in password recovery, namely request validation and password re-
establishment.
6.1 Recovery Request Validation
As discussed in section 4.3, two main security-related steps are commonly
used during request validation, namely use of a CAPTCHA and security
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questions. The CAPTCHA prevents automated attacks on password recov-
ery, and appears a reasonable step to include. Security questions are used
to prevent malicious triggering of password recovery, which could otherwise
be done on a large scale, e.g. using databases of email addresses (since user
names are often the same as email addresses). However, the use and effec-
tiveness of security questions is questionable for a variety of reasons. Firstly,
as discussed in section 5.1, the answers can sometimes be readily guessed or
obtained via social media, and, most seriously, the MitM attacks of Gelernter
et al. [7] suggest that they offer relatively little protection. Secondly, there
are significant privacy issues, since use of such questions involves gathering
personal data, which could be misused. Thirdly, there are also usability is-
sues, in that not all answers to questions can always be readily recalled. It is
therefore highly questionable whether using security questions as a filtering
mechanism is worth the trouble, since while it offers limited security it also
has significant negative privacy and usability disadvantages.
6.2 Password Re-establishment
Depending on how password re-establishment works, there are a number of
important recommendations which emerge from the analysis in section 5.
We look separately at three main areas: email reset, SMS reset, and the use
of trustees.
6.2.1 Email reset
If email reset is used, then the website must try to minimise the chance that
the email reaches an incorrect recipient. This means, for example, that the
email address to which the message is to be sent should ideally have been
used (or confirmed by the user) recently. This could be achieved by asking
the user to enter the email address to which the reset email should be sent,
and only if this matches with the address stored by the website should it be
used.
If verification codes are sent via email, then the discussion in section
5.3 suggests that: (a) they should use as large an alphabet as possible (e.g.
including letters, digits and punctuation), and be as long as possible, subject
to usability constraints; and (b) they should expire after a short period of
time.
Reset URLs sent in an email should: (a) have a short expiry period
(just as for codes); (b) contain a random (secret) string which should be
sufficiently long to make successful guessing attacks highly improbable; and
(c) start with ‘https’, so that the connection to the server is secure.
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6.2.2 SMS reset
If SMS is used to deliver the means to re-establish a password, then very
similar requirements to those for email reset apply. That is, regardless of
what information is sent in the SMS, the website should try to ensure that
the phone number is current, e.g. by requesting the user to re-enter the
number, and only if it matches with the number stored by the website should
it be used. Apart from the requirements applying to verification codes and
links previously mentioned, Gelernter et al. [7] give a list of recommendations
aimed specifically at verification codes sent via SMS. In particular: (a) the
SMS message should be designed so that the code is not displayed on the
phone screen when locked, i.e. forcing the user to unlock the phone to obtain
the code; and (b) the wording of the SMS should minimise the chance that
the user can be deceived into submitting the code to the wrong website,
including indicating the identity of the sending website, the purpose of the
message, and a warning not to divulge the code to any other person or
website.
6.2.3 Trustee-based password recovery
Since significant risks arise from out of date trustee data, as part of the
recovery request process the account holder should be asked to verify con-
tact details for the trustee(s) to be used. For example, the user could be
asked to re-enter trustee email addresses or phone numbers, with the web-
site only using them if they match already stored values. Web sites could
also periodically require users to revalidate trustee data. Clear instructions
should be sent with the password recovery information sent to a trustee, to
minimise the chance that a trustee is misled (e.g. via social engineering) into
disclosing the recovery data to the wrong party.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have given a general model for the password recovery process, and we
have also examined the range of ways in which this model is instantiated
by today’s websites. We then provided the first comprehensive review of
known security and privacy weaknesses in existing approaches to password
recovery; we also examined usability issues. This then allowed us to make a
series of recommendations regarding how best a password recovery process
should be designed.
There is clearly a need for further research in this important area, as well
as new, more secure ways, of performing recovery. Almost all the techniques
in common use are to some extent flawed, and many also pose privacy risks.
One direction for future work would be to conduct large scale practical trials
to try to understand better how users can interact with password recovery
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systems both securely and reliably. A further issue which has hardly been
explored is that of account recovery, i.e. where a user forgets both his/her
user name and password, or a second authentication factor fails. A range of
techniques are in use for this purpose, e.g. backup codes (see 4.1.2), and the
usability and security of these techniques clearly merits further investigation.
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